Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 19 | Issue 2

Article 8

January 2003

Stopping a Trojan Horse: Challenging Pop-up
Advertisements and Embedded Software Schemes
on the Internet through Unfair Competition Laws
Erich D. Schiefelbine

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Erich D. Schiefelbine, Stopping a Trojan Horse: Challenging Pop-up Advertisements and Embedded Software Schemes on the Internet
through Unfair Competition Laws, 19 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 499 (2003).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol19/iss2/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

COMMENT

Stopping a Trojan Horse: Challenging Pop-up
Advertisements and Embedded Software Schemes on the
Internet Through Unfair Competition Laws

Erich D. Schiefelbine
For ten years Greek warriors laid siege on the city of Troy unable
to penetrate its towering block walls. They needed a war machine.
They needed something new, so the Greeks devised a plan. They
built a giant hollow wooden horse. A group of warriors then
climbed into the hollow belly through a hole and enclosed
themselves inside. Meanwhile, the rest of the Greek army piled
into their ships and sailed away. A Greek spy stayed behind and
told the Trojans that the horse was an offering of peace. Elated,
the Trojans ran out of their city to receive it and rejoice over the
fleeing Greek army. A citywide celebration followed, and by
nightfall Troy was in a drunken uproar. Then, in the early hours of
the morning, while everyone was drunk or asleep, the Greeks
emerged from the belly of the horse, climbed down1 its legs, and
silently killed the Trojan sentries at all the city gates.
1.

INTRODUCTION

As of 2000, 94 million people in the United States had access to
the Internet from home.2 It was estimated in 2003 that those with
home-access spend an average of twenty-five and a half hours on the
Internet each month.3 Like the radio and television, it did not take
1. Joshua Darter, The Trojan Horse, availableat
http://darter.ocps.net/classroom/who/darter1/trhorse.htm; see also MICROSOFT ENCARTA (1996).
2. Home Computers and Internet Use in the United States 2, August 2000 Census, at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001 pubs/p23-207.pdf (last visited March 26, 2003).
3. The Big Picture: Traffic Patterns,February2003 Internet Usage Stats, CYBERATLAS,
available at http://cyberatlas.intemet.com/big_picture/trafficpattems/ (last visited March 26,
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long for businesses to realize that the Internet was yet another
medium that could expose their goods and services to potential
customer around the world. Not surprisingly, businesses have come
up with numerous advertising schemes suited to Internet technology.
First, there was simple banner advertising. Then came spam, 4
keyword advertising and metatag schemes. 5 Now Websurfers face
another advertising technology: "pop-up" ads.
Pop-ups are
advertisements that spontaneously appear in a window on the PC
user's screen. The window containing the advertisement covers other
windows that are open on the PC desktop, giving pop-up advertisers
instant face-time with the user. If the consumer clicks on the pop-up
ad, he or she is instantly taken to another Web site. This technology
has inundated the Internet, 6 producing both beneficial and
troublesome results.
Like all advertising, truthful pop-up advertisements keep
consumers well-informed. A well-informed consumer base leads to
greater competition among firms. Furthermore, in the case of the
Internet, Web site owners sell advertising "space", which lowers the
cost of operating a Web site. This allows e-businesses to provide
consumers with "free" software and information. But nothing is free,
and pop-up ads come with a cost.
First, pop-up ads are often annoying. 7 Users have to constantly
close the ad windows to view desired Web content. Second, ebusinesses, whose Web pages are covered by the pop-up windows,
are concerned that they are losing valuable customers under the
theory that the pop-up advertisements are railroading consumers to
other Web sites to conduct their business. With these concerns in
mind, this Comment analyzes whether pop-up advertisements offend
current unfair competition laws. 8 More specifically, does pop-up ad

2003).
4.
Spam refers to unsolicited email sent in bulk to Internet users' email accounts. The
term "spam" originated in a Monty Python sketch. See Beka Ruse, Spam: Where it Came From,
and How to Escape it, at http://www.ezau.com/articles/002.html (last visited March 26, 2003).
5.
See Kurt M. Saunders, Confusion is the Key: Trademark Analysis of Keyword Banner
Advertising, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 543 (2002).

6. "An estimated 4.8 million ads popped up on computer screens worldwide in July,
interrupting cybersurfers and forcing them to manually delete windows..." Jon Schwartz,
EarthlinkJoins Movement to Kill Pop-up Ads, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 2002, at D3, available at

http://www.iab.net/news/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
7. In August 2002, lVillage.com--an entertainment and news site geared toward
women-reported that "93% of 200 visitors recently called pop-up advertising the most
'frustrating' part of the Web." Id.
8. Unfair competition broadly describes several causes of action including trademark
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software present courts with novel 9 issues in unfair competition law,
and if so, how should those issues be resolved? These questions will
be answered by analyzing the arguments made in one of the first popup ad cases to reach the courts-Washington Post v. Gator,Inc. This
Comment will demonstrate that ad server hosts and pop-up
advertisers should be liable to trademark holders for infringement and
dilution.
Part II of this Comment offers a more detailed background of
Adware technology, its specific purpose on the Internet, and sets up
the factual context of this Comment by presenting the facts and
parties of Washington Post v. Gator, Inc. Part III analyzes whether
pop-up ads should survive a trademark holder's claims based on the
federal trademark statute. In particular, Part III discusses whether
pop-up ad servers "use" trademarks that simultaneously appear
underneath and beside the pop-up advertisement. It will also discuss
initial interest confusion as a theory of consumer confusion stemming
from pop-up ads. Part IV explores the federal unfair competition
statute and if Adware constitutes a "device" used to confuse
consumers. Part V of this Comment focuses on dilution and if pop-up
ads fit appropriately into either a tarnishment or blurring theory. Part
VII briefly discusses the First Amendment and fair use as possible
defenses to potential unfair competition claims. This Comment
concludes by discussing whether the underlying justifications of
unfair competition laws support or condemn the use of pop-up
advertisements.
II. POP-UP TECHNOLOGY AND ITS PURPOSE ON THE
INTERNET
A.

"Adware" and "Spyware" and How They Got on Your
Computer

Pop-up ads are advertisements that spontaneously appear on an
Internet-user's screen in a separate window. The pop-up window

infringement, unfair competition, trademark dilution, and false or misleading advertising. See
Moseley v. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2002).
9. This Comment seeks to identify and analyze issues of unfair competition heretofore
never presented to courts by virtue of a new technology. Traditional issues underlying unfair
competition claims, such as the strength and adequacy of consumer surveys, trademark validity,
etc., are not examined here in detail. Although Adware technology may raise new questions
regarding the likelihood of confusion factors employed by each circuit, this Comment only
discusses "initial interest confusion" as a theory of confusion leading to liability in Adware
cases.
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usually superimposes itself on all existing content, but windows can
also "pop under" screen content. Naturally, when these ad windows
appear, the user is baffled because the user has done nothing to trigger
the ad... or so she believes. Unbeknownst to most Internet users,
pop-up ads appear on their screens because of software the user
voluntarily put on his or her computer.
The software that enables pop-ups is collectively known as
"Adware" or "Spyware". 1° Adware is stealthily embedded in other
software that users want to download for personal use. The best
example is the Kazaa Media Desktop software. Kazaa is peer-to-peer
software that allows users to swap files over the Internet (e.g., music,
movies, pictures, etc.). When a user downloads the Kazaa Media
Desktop, Adware software, such as Cydoor, Doubleclick, and
WhenU, accompanies that download, embedded in the Kazaa
program. 1 And although Kazaa's User Agreement says that users
agree to download the Adware before downloading the Media
Desktop, 12 most users unwittingly click the default option to accept
the agreement before reading it because the agreement is so dense and
convoluted.
Once the Adware is downloaded, the damage is done. "A little
application sits on your computer, tracks your Internet usage and
feeds this information back to the ad server."' 13 The remote ad server
then sends pop-up ads to the user's screen, based on "[the user's]
country... browsing habits, search engine keyword searches, and
other criteria.' 14 In summary, this technology is like a "Trojan
Horse:" users open up their computer to free software without
realizing that they are also inviting embedded Adware software onto

10.

Gord Hotchkiss, Adware and Spyware: Beware!, SEARCH ENGINE POSITION, at

http://www.searchengineposition.com/info/netprofit/spyware.asp (last visited March 26, 2003).
Hotchiss defines Adware as, "[a]ny software application in which the advertising banners are
displayed while the program is running." Id.
11.
Id.
12. See Kazaa Media Desktop Version 2.1 End User License Agreement, at
http://www.kazaa.com/us/terms.htm (March 26, 2003). In Gator, discussed infra, Gator
asserted that "the user installs [the] software and invites those pop-up windows to occur...."
Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 19, Ins. 23-25, Wash. Post
Interactive Co. v. Gator Corp., CV 02-909-A (2002 E.D. Va.). Furthermore, "[Gator] explicitly
discloses in advance to each user that both the software product and the GAIN AdServer
software will be installed together .. " Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 4, Wash. Post Interactive Co. v. Gator Corp., (E.D Va. 2002), (CV 02-909-A),
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/gator (last visited March 31, 2003).
13.
Id. It is this remote surveillance that gave rise to the term "Spyware."
14.

Id.
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their system.5
B. The Purpose of Pop-Up Ads: A Double Edged Sword
To understand the legal analysis that follows, it is critical to first
understand why e-businesses are using pop-up advertising. Two
parties are involved in pop-up advertising: the ad server host and the
advertiser. The ad server host is the company that embeds Adware
with their software, and then sells "advertising space" by hosting the
pop-up ads on their server.
The ad server host sells pop-up
advertising space to offset the costs of operating its own Web site.
For example, Celebrity Desktop offers free wallpaper and desktop
6
software that displays images of celebrities among other things.'
Celebrity desktop explains that it uses Adware to pay for the
"excessive server rental and bandwidth bills it racks up;' 17 Celebrity
Desktop's site costs $6,000 a year to operate.' 8 So rather than charge
their customers for their free software, some businesses-such as
Kazaa-bundle Adware into their software and then sell "advertising
space."' 19
The second party involved in pop-up advertising is the
advertiser. As briefly explained above, the ad host server is triggered
when the user enters a particular keyword on a search engine or a
domain name. 20 Pop-up advertisers buy keywords from the ad host
server, based on the product they are trying to sell and their target
audience. Keyword purchasing has 21
led advertisers to engage in what
is known as a "hijacking" campaign.
Hijacking is when one business purchases its competitors' trade
names as keywords. For instance, when users went to 1-800Flowers.com, a pop-up ad for FTD.com popped up on the screen. 22 1-

15. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 8, Gator
(CV 02-909-A), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/gator (last visited
March 31, 2003).
16. See www.celebritydesktop.com.
17. "We're under contract with a couple advertising companies to run their banners." See
Celebrity Desktop, FAQs Q and A, at http://www.celebritydesktop.com/help/faqs/popups.shtml
(last visited March 26, 2003)
18. See id ("[S]o this is why we use pop-up advertising to help pay off the rising monthly
web bills".).
19. Stefanie Olsen, Chorus of Gator Critics Grows, CNET NEWS, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-272244.html (last visited March 26, 2003).
20. See Stefanie Olsen, Web Sites Prey on Rivals' Stores, CNET NEWS, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-271196.html (last visited March 30, 2003).
21.
Id.
22. Id.
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800-Flowers.com and FTD.com compete with each other head-tohead as online flower retailers.
Similarly, when users visited
Americanairlines.com, a Delta Airlines promotion appeared on the
screen.23 More recently, while doing research for this Comment, a
pop-up advertisement appeared on the author's screen when a certain
online travel business' opening page loaded. At first glance, it was
difficult to tell where the pop-up advertisement by a competing online
travel business begaff and where it ended, against the background of
the underlying Web site's page, suggesting an affiliation between the
two companies.
Hijacking has created a love-hate relationship among ecommerce businesses. On one hand, the exposure from pop-up ads is
so substantial that most online businesses want to get involved. Yet
on the other hand, those same online businesses do not like being the
target of a competitor's hijack campaign. 24
Consequently, ebusinesses are beginning to challenge the legality of Adware and
embedded software schemes.
C. The Gator Litigation
At the moment, very little literature exists on the legality of
embedded software schemes such as Adware.
Moreover, the
intellectual property issues raised by such schemes have not been
fully litigated in the federal courts. In fact, one of the only court
orders issued on the legality of pop-up ads was a preliminary
injunction on the use of such ads. In August 2002, a United States
District Court in Alexandria, Virginia enjoined the Gator Corporation
("Gator") from running their ad server and version of Adware.25 The
plaintiffs' motion to enjoin Gator's activities rested entirely on
intellectual property law.26 Since the court gave no written opinion
with its order, the arguments the plaintiffs made to secure the
injunction (and Gator's counter arguments) deserve further legal
analysis. The Gator case may serve to predict whether pop-up ads
will ultimately pass judicial muster.

23.
Id.
24.
Referring to the ironic relationship that hijack ads created, a representative from the
Gator Corporation (an ad host server) stated, "We get lots of angry calls; maybe even an
attorney calls up because they're angry... [but] the next call we get is usually from the VP of
sales, saying 'We would like to work with you."' Id.
25.
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Gator (CV 02-909-A),
availableat http://www.haledorr.com/pdf/gator order.pdf (last visited March 25, 2003).
26.
909-A).

See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction, Gator (CV 02-
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The Gator Corporation is located in Redwood City, California,
and its business is e-commerce.27 Gator offers Web surfers a digital
wallet software product known as the eWALLET. The eWALLET
software is "free." It "provides users with a mechanism for storing
personal information about themselves, passwords, user identification
numbers and names, and other data that consumers routinely need to
input on electronic forms when they shop for goods and services on
the Internet. 28 Embedded in the eWALLET software is another
piece of software called the OfferCompanion. OfferCompanion is a
type of Adware. Gator-as the ad host server--"monitors Web
surfing behavior and delivers targeted pop-up ads to viewers" via
OfferCompanion. 29 The pop-up ads identify Gator as the host server
because they contain the word GAIN 30 in the upper left hand comer of
Gator's pop-up window. OfferCompanion launches and operates
whenever a user is using an Internet browser.
The plaintiffs suing Gator were news conglomerates, each
operating sites on the Internet. 3 1 The plaintiffs stated that they were
among the world's foremost providers of news and that Gator was
essentially a "parasite" on the World Wide Web.32 The plaintiffs
alleged that Gator was making money and free riding off of their
business by "placing advertisements for third parties on the
[p]laintiffs' web sites without [p]laintiffs' authorization., 33 As an
example,
plaintiffs'
complaint
contained
a
printout
of
Concierge.com's Web site covered in part by a Travelocity.com popup advertisement.
Concierge.com-one of the plaintiffs-and
Travelocity.com are direct competitors in the e-travel business. This
example of hijacking set up the plaintiffs' intellectual property
theories against Gator as the ad host server responsible for such ad
windows.

27. See Gator Corp. homepage, at http://www.gator.com (last visited March 30, 2003).
28. Declaration of Benjamin G. Edelmen at 2, Gator (CV 02-909-A), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/pubs/gator-062502.pdf (last visited March 30,
2003).
29. Stefanie Olsen, PublishersSue Gator Over Pop-Ups,CNET NEWS, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-940072.html (last visited March 30, 2003).
30. GAIN stands for "Gator Advertising and Information Network." See
www.gator.com.
31.
Complaint at 1, Gator(CV 02-909-A), availableat
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/gator (last visitied March 30, 2003).
32. Id. at 1.
33. Id.
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III. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
A.

"Use" in Commerce

The Gator plaintiffs first claimed that the pop-up windows
infringed their registered trademark rights under Section 32 of the
Lanham Act. 34 Section 32 gives registered trademark holders a cause

of action against any one who,
use[s] commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or
in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive...35
A threshold burden for the mark-holder under Section 32 is to
demonstrate that the defendant has used their mark in commerce.36
Accordingly, the plaintiffs first argued that Gator's advertising
scheme "used" their registered marks because Gator inserted its
windows onto pages that simultaneously displayed the plaintiffs'
37
marks.
Gator argued that it did not "use" plaintiffs' marks in commerce
by inserting pop-up ads into the plaintiffs' Web pages. 38 Gator
claimed that their software did not insert anything into plaintiffs' Web
sites and did not alter their appearance in any way. 39 In fact, "[the
advertisements] reside only on its users' computers and are
sequentially displayed in stand-alone windows separate and apart
from any browser window displaying plaintiffs' Web sites. ' 40
Responding at oral argument, the plaintiffs were quick to point
out that Section 45 of Act41 clearly states that use of another's mark in
34. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 19, Gator (CV 02909-A).
15 U.S.C. § 11 14(a)(l) (2002) (emphasis added).
35.
36. Id.
37. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 19, Gator (CV 02909-A).
38. Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 17, Gator (CV 02-909A).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41.
15 U.S.C. §1127 (2002). For purposes of this Act, a mark shall be deemed to be in
use in commerce(1) on goods when(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays
associated there with or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of
the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated
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commerce includes display of the mark in the sale -or advertising of
services and the services are rendered in commerce.4 2 However, the
definition of "use in commerce" in Section 45 is used to determine
use in commerce as it relates to federal trademark registration,not as
it relates to infringing use.43 Thus, plaintiffs' argument did not
answer the issue raised by the defendant: Did Gator "use" the
plaintiffs' registered marks where plaintiffs' marks were visible
underneath and alongside Gator's pop-up windows, but not within the
pop-up windows themselves?
1. The "Single Advertisement" Theory
There are at least two theories available to the plaintiffs on the
issue of "use" in the pop-up advertisement context. The first could be
described as the "single advertisement" theory. It is best illustrated
with a low-tech analogy. Suppose a consumer was walking through a
shopping mall and saw two advertisements hanging from the ceiling.
One advertisements was for Nike® soccer shoes, and the other was for
Adidas® soccer shoes. From the consumer's point of reference,
Nike's advertisement was closer and partially blocked full view of the
Adidas advertisement. The Adidas name and accompanying logos
were still visible, although more difficult to see.
It is unlikely that the consumer would believe that Nike was
using the Adidas logo in Nike's advertisement merely because Nike's
ad overlapped the Adidas ad. This is because the advertisements are
separated by open space and viewed in the third dimension. In
contrast, e-consumers view pop-up advertisements and underlying
Web sites on a flat, two-dimensional plane. That is, pop-up ads "use"
the underlying Web site's marks because, from the consumer's point
of reference, the screen is a single advertisement on a two
dimensional plane. And where a defendant displays both its mark and
its competitor's mark on the defendant's advertisements in a way that
is likely to confuse consumers, the defendant has "used" its

with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and
the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than
one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering
the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services.
Id.
42.
909-A).
43.

Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10, In. 23, Gator (CV 02JEROME GILSON, TRADMARK PROTECTION & PRACTICE § 11.03 (2002).
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competitor's mark. 4 If a court were to view the user's monitor as a
single advertisement, then advertisement host servers like Gator
clearly "use" the plaintiffs' registered marks in commerce; this was
essentially the Gator plaintiffs' first argument 5
Gator suggested, however, that if a pop-up window constitutes
"use" merely because it overlaps another window revealing a
trademark, then Microsoft-and any other party displaying its content
in a smaller window-would be liable to trademark holders whose
content was partially covered by virtue of the Windows operating
system design.46 For instance, the "single advertisement" approach
suggests that Yahoo!, Inc. could be liable to the Wall Street Journal
because Yahoo!'s Instant Messenger partially overlays the Wall Street
Journal's Web site. Gator's argument has a greater bark than bite,
however.
Even if a court held that a party's overlying window "used" a
trademark that simultaneously appeared in an underlying window, the
ultimate question in infringement suits is the likelihood of consumer
confusion, not merely whether a trademark was "used". In most
cases, consumers will not think Yahoo! now owns WordPerfect's
marks or products merely because Yahoo!'s Instant Messenger is
overlying a WordPerfect 9.0 window. Or if Firestone, Inc.'s Web site
for tires was partially visible beneath an overlying Outlook Express
window, users are not likely to believe that Firestone and Microsoft
have now merged. This is because when a consumer loads software
such as Microsoft's products or Yahoo! Instant Messenger onto their
computer the consumer i) makes a conscious decision to install ii) a
product they are familiar with, iii) which they launch voluntarily and
iv) which they desire to have on their computer. Gator's argument,
therefore, exaggerates the implications and effects that the "single
advertisement" view of "use" would have on software products that
run on the Windows operating system.

44. See e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/Movie Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311 (2d
Cir. 1987).
45. Using a blowup of plaintiffs' USA Today Web page covered partly a pop-up ad, the
plaintiffs argued that "[t]hey also use the marks in commerce by putting them in close proximity
to ours. These are trademarks, USA Today.

How, if you see this, could you not come away

thinking that this [advertisement] is part of USA Today." Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 11, Ins. 1-22, Gator (CV 02-909-A).
46. "At anytime, a user may have several overlapping windows open on the screen
reflecting content from a variety of sources and may even have more than one browser window
open at a time." Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 17, Gator (CV
02-909-A).

2003]

POP-UPADS & EMBEDDED SOFTWARE SCHEMES

2.

509

Initial Interest "Use"

The second way to approach the question of "use" in a pop-up
case is to argue the "initial interest confusion" theory, taken from
recent banner advertisement and metatag cases. The court in Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape decided whether use of trademarked
terms in search engine technology constituted infringing "use. 47 The
defendant, Netscape, operated an Internet search engine; the search
engine would find and list Web sites on the Internet based on userprovided keywords entered at the Netscape site.48 Netscape sold
advertising space on the Web page that listed the keyword "search
results;" the advertisements would appear as "banner advertisements"
on the borders surrounding the search results text. 49 As part of
Netscape's advertisement package, Netscape sold search terms to
advertisers that Netscape would "key" to the advertisers' ads. 50
Netscape keyed "various adult entertainment ads to a group of over
450 terms related to adult entertainment, including the terms
'playboy' and 'playmate. '' Thus, when a user entered the search
term "playboy", banner ads for Playboy's competitors would appear
on the search results page.
Playboy argued that Netscape infringed its registered marks
"Playboy®" and "Playmate®'' by marketing and selling the words
52
44
"playboy" and "playmate" to advertisers.
Netscape argued that
although Playboy may own the registered marks "Playboy®'' and
"Playmate,8 ' Netscape "[did] not actually 'use' the trademarks qua
trademarks. 3 The court found that Internet users could not use the
words "Playboy®'' and "Playmate®' ' as search terms.54 Instead, users
could only enter the words "playboy" and "playmate" into the search;
and since Netscape also used the generic form "playboy" and
"playmate" to program its search engine algorithm, the court found
that Netscape had not "used" Playboy's marks in commerce.
Moreover, the court opined that since the words 'playboy" and
"playmate" are English in their own right... whether the user is
looking for goods and services covered by [Playboy's] trademarks or
47.

Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communs., Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (9th Cir.

1999); affd, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999).

48.

Id.at 1072.

49.

Id.

50.
51.

Id.
Id.

52.

Playboy,55 F. Supp.2d at1073.

53.
54.

Id.
Id.at 1078.
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something altogether unrelated to Playboy is anybody's guess. 55
Playboy suggests that "use of trademarked key words that are not
also English words, such as 'AOL,' 'Exxon,' or 'Bose"' should be
infringing "use. 56 Accordingly, Gator "used" plaintiffs' registered
marks in commerce because it used the plaintiffs' registered marks
and domain names in the embedded Adware to key and trigger popup ads from Gator's ad server. 57
And unlike "playboy" and
"playmate," most of the plaintiffs' registered trademarks and domain
names are not "English words in their own right" and have no generic
use (e.g., "Wall Street Journal," "Washington Post," "Epicurious").
The metatag cases equally undermine an ad server's position. In
Brookfield Comm. v. West Coast Enterprises Corp., the Ninth Circuit
was asked to decide whether using a competitor's trademark as a
metatag constituted trademark infringement.
Brookfield sold
software
that "featured a searchable
database
containing
entertainment-industry related information." 58 Brookfield's software
was sold under their registered mark, "MovieBuff."
In 1996,
Brookfield wanted to move its enterprise online and attempted to
register the domain name "moviebuff.com." However, West Coastone of the nation's largest video rental chains-had already registered
"moviebuff.com."
West Coast used "moviebuff' as a metatag. A metatag is a word
or phrase embedded in the Web site's programming code (e.g.,
HTML).59 Metatags are embedded in Web site programming code so
that search engines-searching for particular keywords and termswill identify and list the Web site on a "search results" page. West
Coast was using "moviebuff' as a metatag in its Web site
"westcoast.com." On "westcoast.com" West Coast offered its own
searchable entertainment database. Thus, when users entered the term
"moviebuff" into a search engine, the search would list

55. Id. at 1073. But see Saunders, supra note 5, at 564 (arguing that "the court's
conclusion that the Internet users and defendants in this case were not using the words here as
trademarks is questionable at best.").
56. Beth I. Z. Boland, Daniel B. Trinkle & Christine M. Baker, "Initial Interest
Confusion " and the Use of Metatags and Keyed Banner Ads in Internet Trademark Law, 45
BOSTON BAR ASSN. 6, 21 (Sept./Oct. 2001).

57. Attorney for Gator: "[F]or example, Your Honor, one of the things we point out in
our paper is that a user may well put in a URL that would act as a triggerfor us to send and
advertisement." Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 12, Ins. 7-8, 13-15,
22, Gator(CV 02-909-A) (emphasis added).
58. See Brookfield Communs. Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.
1999).
59. Id. at 1045.
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"westcoast.com" instead of Brookfield's products.
Although the issue of trademark "use" was not specifically
addressed as it was in Playboy, the court held that West Coast was
The court found
infringing Brookfield's MovieBuff mark.
infringement because "West Coast uses Brookfield's trademark... to
describe its own product and to attract people to its Web site in the
case of the metatags.,, 60 This was so, even though the consumer never
even saw the metatag "moviebuff. ' '61 Other courts have followed suit
and found that such use of metatags constitutes infringing "use" under

Section 32.62
Adware combines metatag and search engine technology into
one; the embedded software works together with the ad server to
search the user's computer and launch pop-up advertisements based
on user-entered keywords. And as discussed supra, the keywords that
Adware searches for include registered trademarks that do not have
generic uses. Such use, under Brookfield and its offspring, constitutes
"use" as used in Section 32 of the Lanham Act.
B. Likelihood of Confusion: "InitialInterest Confusion"
The crux of trademark infringement suits is the plaintiffs burden
to prove the likelihood of consumer confusion. In the Gator case,
plaintiffs argued that the instant juxtaposition of the pop-up
advertisements and plaintiffs' marks caused consumers to believe that
the plaintiffs were somehow affiliated with Gator, or were sponsors of
Gator and the pop-up advertisers.63 Moreover, the plaintiffs argued
that consumers believed that plaintiffs had authorized the pop-up
advertisers to superimpose their advertisements on plaintiffs' Web
60.

Id.at 1066.

Maureen A. O'Rourke, Defining the Limits of Free-Riding in Cyberspace: Trademark
61.
Liabilityfor Metataging, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 277, 297 (1998).
62.
"Other post-Brookfield courts have looked to an initial interest confusion analysis to

find that metatagging another's trademark constituted an infringing use of the mark. See, e.g.,
New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants v. Eric Louis Associates, Inc., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("NYSSCPA") (decisive factor in finding likelihood of confusion

was defendant's "use of the [plaintiffs mark in the] 'nysscpa.com' domain name and the
'NYSSCPA' meta-tag [which] caused a likelihood of confusion because it created initial interest
confusion"); Eli Lilly and Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000), affd, 86
F. Supp. 2d 834 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (finding that the "clear intent" of defendant's listing of Eli

Lilly's mark "Prozac" among its metatags, "whether or not it was successful, was to divert
Internet users searching for information on PROZAC(R) to [defendant's] Web site"). Boland,
Trinkle & Baker, supra note 56, at 19.
63. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 19, Gator (CV 02909-A) (citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1992);
IDV N. Am., Inc. v. S&M Brands, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 815, 826 (E.D. Va. 1998)).
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sites. In support of this argument, plaintiffs proffered a consumer
survey, demonstrating that a full 66% of those surveyed believed64 the
plaintiffs were affiliated with, and had authorized the pop-up ads.
Gator's counter argument was that confusion as to the origin of
the product being advertised was the appropriate inquiry, not whether
there was confusion as to the origin of the advertisement.65 "The
viewers of plaintiffs' Web pages are not likely, as a result of this type
of confusion, to purchase a product on the mistaken belief as to its
source-the source of the products is clear in the content of the popup advertisement." 66 Under the existing theory of "initial interest
confusion," however, Gator's argument should fail.
"The unauthorized use of another's trademark to lure consumers
can create what is called 'initial interest confusion'-i.e. a bait-andswitch-type of confusion over a trademarked name that might attract a
consumer's interest in a competitor or competitor's goods-and can
be actionable just as when the confusion arises at the point of sale. 67
Moreover the Ninth Circuit recently stated,
Initial interest confusion occurs when the defendant uses the
plaintiffs trademark 'in a manner calculated to capture initial
consumer attention, even though no actual sale is finally completed
as a result of the confusion.' Initial interest confusion permits a
finding of a likelihood of confusion although the consumer quickly
becomes aware of the source's actual
identity and no purchase is
68
made as a result of the confusion.
In 1987, the Second Circuit decided HBO v. Showtime/Movie
Channel,69 a case very similar to the Gator case in some respects.
Although the court did not use the words "initial interest confusion,"
the defendant's advertising scheme was designed in "a manner
calculated'to capture initial interest consumer attention." 70 HBO and

64.
Id. Although Gator challenged the validity of the survey, 66% of those surveyed
believed that "pop-up advertisements are sponsored by or authorized by the Web site in which
they appear." Forty-five percent of those surveyed believed that "pop-up advertisements have

been pre-screened and approved by the Web site on which they appear." Id. at 21.
65. Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at18, Gator (CV 02-909A) (citing Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228-29 (7th Cir. 1993)).

66. Id.
67.
Boland, Trinkle & Baker, supranote 56, at 6.
68. Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062 (citing Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d
1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997))).
69. Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/Movie Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311 (2d Cir.
1987).
70. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062.
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Showtime compete head-to-head for cable-movie viewers.
In
Showtime, Showtime juxtaposed its trademarks and HBO's marks in
7
its advertisements at a national cable programming convention. 1
Some of Showtime's marketing materials contained slogans such as,
"Showtime & HBO. It's Not Either/Or Anymore," and a disclaimer of
affiliation.72
HBO sought a preliminary injunction to prevent
Showtime from using its mark in Showtime's promotional materials.
Like the Gator plaintiffs, HBO's argument was that Showtime's
use of HBO's mark-with accompanying slogans-was confusing
because it initially suggested that HBO and Showtime had merged or
were engaged in a strategic and cooperative promotional campaign. 3
Also like the Gator plaintiffs, HBO presented evidence that
consumers believed the parties were involved in a joint promotion
campaign. 74 Both the district court and the Second Circuit agreed,
and despite Showtime's disclaimer, the injunction was granted and
then affirmed.75
The Second Circuit first reviewed Section 32 of the Lanham
Act.76 The court then found that Showtime's campaign could mislead
and confuse consumers by suggesting that "Showtime and HBO have
merged, are jointly marketing their services (possibly to the exclusion
of their independent services) or are engaged in some other type of
cooperative production or marketing venture. 7 7 Consumer confusion
as to affiliation and sponsorship is sufficient in the majority of
jurisdictions.7 8
71.
Showlime, 832 F.2d at 1313.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.at 131S.
75. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's order other grounds. Showtime, 832
F.2d at 1317.
76. Id.at 1314.
77. Id.at 1315.
78. See e.g., Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, No. 99 Civ.10713,
2002 WL 1870307, at *2 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 13, 2002) ("Confusion exists... where consumers are
likely to believe that the mark's owner sponsored, endorsed, or otherwise approved the
defendant's use of the mark."); Pizza Hut, Inc. v. White, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19930, at *7
(N.D. Tx. 2002), citing ProfessionalGolfers Ass "nof America v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514

F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1975). "It is well established that 'falsely suggesting affiliation with the
trademark owner in a manner likely to cause confusion as to source of sponsorship constitutes
infringement."' Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1561 (M.D. Fl. 1993), citing
Burger King v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1492 (lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102
(1984). Further, "[t]he law is established that falsely suggesting the existence of affiliation with
a well-known business by usurping the latter's good-will constitutes both trademark
infringement and unfair competition." Id. Showtime/The Movie Channel v. Covered Bridge
Condominium Assoc., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1080, 1089 (S.D. Fla. 1988), quoting Volkswagenwerk
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Gator's campaign, like Showtime's, juxtaposed a competitor's
advertisement with the plaintiffs' Web site and trademarks. Initial
consumer confusion as to the plaintiffs' affiliation with the defendant
also existed in both cases. And in both cases, although the source of
the product was clear from the advertisements, the positioning of the
advertisements created confusion as to the plaintiffs' affiliation,
authorization and sponsorship.
Furthermore, both Gator's and
Showtime's advertisement schemes were designed to lure interested
consumers away from competitors and into the purchase of
Gator/Showtime products instead.
Therefore, Gator's focus on
confusion as to the origin of the product is overly narrow. The
Lanham Act protects registered mark holders and consumers from
more than mere product source confusion; initial confusion as to
sponsorship and affiliation are equally proscribed by the Act.
Another low-tech analogy may serve to clarify.
Say a consumer, John, wants to purchase a pair of Steve
Madden® shoes. Having purchased shoes at Nordstrom before, John's
initial hunch is that Nordstrom may sell the pair he is looking for.
John heads over to Nordstrom, and once inside Nordstrom's shoe
department a person wearing a Nordstrom name tag hands John the
following flyer: "Steve Madden shoes 30-60% off-Now at Jim's
Shoes!!!" Curious, John heads over to Jim's Shoes, located just
outside Nordstrom, and purchases a pair of Steve Madden shoes.
Note that John never once was confused as to the origin of the
shoes themselves; he knew all along that Steve Madden, Ltd. was the
manufacturer of shoes he sought to purchase. Nevertheless, the way
in which the Jim's Shoes advertisement was passively presented
inside Nordstrom from a person wearing a Nordstrom's name tag may
give consumers like John the impression that Jim's Shoes is
associated or affiliated with Nordstrom. In addition, John is likely to
falsely believe that Nordstom authorized Jim's Shoes to use their
nametag and advertise on their property. Furthermore, the Jim's
Shoes campaign is specifically designed to railroad consumers in
Nordstrom's into Jim's Shoes, so they will purchase shoes from Jim's
Shoes instead of Nordstrom's.
Gator, like Jim's Shoes, used
another's trademark and location to take advantage of initial
consumer interest, and to "hijack" potential customers from its
competitors.
Although the initial interest confusion theory in the context of
pop-up advertisements does not fit squarely into the low-tech
Aktiengesellschaft v. Tatum, 344 F. Supp. 235, 237 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
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analogies giving rise to initial interest confusion in the context of
metatags and banner ads,79 Adware nevertheless is a species of initial
interest confusion; the placement of the overlying pop-up ad is
calculated to lure initial viewers' attention to the overlying
advertiser's product instead of the underlying product.
These
schemes prey on (and succeed at the expense of) the goodwill of the
underlying Web site; therefore, this breed of confusion is exactly
what the Lanham Act seeks to proscribe. 0
"Initial interest confusion" is only the beginning. Plaintiffs, such
as those in Gator, still must demonstrate that consumers were likely
to be confused as to the origin, sponsorship, affiliation, or association
8
based on a number of similar factors used in each circuit. 1
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has said, despite its Sleekcraft factors,
"actionable initial interest confusion on the Internet is determined in
largepart by the relatedness of the goods offered and the level of care
exercised by the consumer., 82 Thus, where the product in the pop-up
advertisement is closely related or identical to the product on the
underlying Web page, there should be a presumption in favor of
infringement.
IV. UNFAIR COMPETITION
The second theory that the Gator plaintiffs relied on was unfair
competition. The federal unfair competition statute affords even
broader protection than Section 32.83 The federal unfair competition
statute prohibits,
[U]se of any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof.., which is likely to cause confusion... as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another
79.
80.

See e.g., Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064.
See 3 J THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 23:01(4)(b) (3d ed. 1995).

81. E.g., the factors used to determine likelihood of consumer confusion in the Ninth
Circuit are known as the Sleekraft factors. Those factors are:
(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of
actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to
be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of
expansion of the product lines.
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
82. Interstellar,304 F.3d at 945.
83.
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 22, Gator (CV 02909-A) (citing Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)).
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The plaintiffs argued that "Section 43(a) is written as if it had
Gator's advertising scheme in mind" because OfferCompanion is a
device that facilitates initial interest confusion.85 This argument
requires a different analysis from the trademark infringement analysis
offered in Part III supra, because the embedded software that is
communicating between the PC user's computer and the ad host
server (the "scheme") is viewed as the device "used" to confuse
consumers, not what appears as a single advertisement on the user's
screen. In response, Gator argued, "the word 'device' in Section
43(a), however, merely encompasses other types of symbols used as
source identifiers and concerns a device of a plaintiffthat a defendant
improperly uses in commerce. 86 The issue then, is whether the
meaning of the word "device" is limited to icons, symbols and other
sensory indicia that associate a good or service in the consumer's
mind with a particular source. Or does the word "device," as used in
the Lanham Act, carry a broader meaning which includes schemes
like Adware? Since little legislative history exists on the exact
meaning of the word, the answer may likely be found in the case
law-specifically those cases discussing trade dress. This is because
Gator's scheme, like most trade dress, does not use perceivable words
to communicate with consumers.
Trade dress refers to a broad species of source identifiers that
include color combinations, wrapping and dimensional features. 87 It
has been defined as,
the total image of a product or service, including product features
such as design, size, shape, color, packaging, labels, color
combinations, graphics, or service business features such as retail
decor, architectural features, menus, restaurant layouts, styles of
service,
costumes, and occasionally marketing techniques as
88
well.

84.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2002) (emphasis added).

85.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 22, Gator (CV 02-

909-A).

86.

Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 17-18, Gator (CV 02-

909-A).

87.
"The courts and the Patent and Trademark Office have authorized for use as a mark a
particular shape (of a Coca-Cola bottle), a particular sound (of NBC's three chimes), and even a
particular scent (of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread)." Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (finding that a color, in some circumstances, is capable of trademark
protection).
88.

GILSON, supra note 43, §7.02[7][c].
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Trade dress may also include a product's nonfunctional design
89
aspects, so long as they have acquired secondary meaning.
Similarly, fragrances and sounds are also recognized as trade dress. 90
The common thread among trade dress source identifiers is twofold:
they do not use language to indicate the product's source and they
somehow appeal to the senses. The word "device," therefore, should
mean almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning..."
to a consumer, whether it uses language or not. 91 Thus, the word
"device" is both limited and broad.
The whole premise of the plaintiffs' case in Gator was that the
consumer did not know that the defendant's scheme was operating on
their computer (which led to consumer confusion). The consumer
never sees, hears or otherwise knows that a remote ad server host is
monitoring their Web-surfing habits. Simply, Gator's scheme appeals
to none of the consumer's senses, so it cannot be a "device" used as a
source identifier.
Arguing that Gator's scheme is a "device" is flawed on a more
fundamental level too. As Gator pointed out, Section 43(a) refers to
the defendant's use of any "word, term, name, symbol, or device" that
the plaintiffuses on its products as a source identifier; it does not refer
to the defendant's use of any "word, term, name, symbol, or
92
device."
V. TRADEMARK DILUTION
Dilution was the third cause of action-rooted in unfair
competition-raised by the Gator plaintiffs. Trademark dilution is
the gradual whittling away of the hold a mark has upon the public's
mind by virtue of its use on noncompeting goods.93 The idea
underlying dilution is that the value of a trademark could be reduced
overtime by similar marks, regardless of whether the similar mark
was on a competing good or not. 94 Dilution proponents urge that

89. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
90. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163.
91. Id.at 162.
92. See e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. 159; Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. 205.
93. See e.g., Frank Schecter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REv. 813 (1927).
94. See id.
at 820.
Trademark dilution laws protect 'distinctive' or 'famous' trademarks from certain
unauthorized uses of the marks regardless of a showing of competition or
likelihood of confusion. Indeed, the very purpose of dilution statutes is to protect
trademarks from damage caused by the use of the marks in non-competing
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marks could devalue even in the absence of consumer confusion as to

product origin, because the value of a mark is the consumer
association with product quality. 95 Because pop-up advertising is new
to the law, the plaintiffs' complaint raises the question of whether
Adware schemes can fit into a dilution theory. There are two lines of
trademark dilution: tamishment and blurring.
Tarnishment occurs where a famous mark is associated with
another product or context that is degrading and unwholesome.96 The

damage that occurs is the inability of consumers to divorce such
offensive images or contexts from the mark holder's business.

In

contrast, blurring is "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services.

97

Some have interpreted

this to mean that blurring occurs when the junior user "diminishes the
power of a famous mark to quickly call to mind and distinguish the
goods... associated with that mark., 98 Moreover, blurring occurs
when the junior and senior user's marks are identical, but their
products are completely different. The Federal Trademark Dilution
Act (FTDA) protects mark holders from both types of dilution. 99 The
FTDA provides,
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the
principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems
reasonable, to an injunction against another person's commercial
use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after

endeavors. Whereas traditional trademark law sought primarily to protect
consumers, dilution laws place more emphasis on protecting the investment of
the trademark owners. Still, dilution laws do promote consumer welfare: if
trademarks are valuable to consumers, then protecting businesses' investments in
trademarks will benefit consumers by increasing the willingness of businesses to
invest in the creation of recognized marks.
Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1302 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
95.
See Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Meta-tages: An
IntellectualPropertyAnalysis, 38 IDEA 243, 252 (1998).
96.
See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp 2d 1161, 1166 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) ("Here, [plaintiff] argues that [defendant] has tarnished its mark by associating it
with pornography.").
97.
98.

15 U.S.C § 1127 (2002).
See Kuester & Nieves, supra note 95, at 252.

99.
On July 19, 1995, the House Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property
held a I-day hearing on H. R. 1295. No opposition to the bill was voiced at the hearing and,
with one minor amendment that extended protection to unregistered as well as registered marks,
the subcommittee endorsed the bill and it passed the House unanimously. The committee's
report stated that the "purpose of H. R. 1295 is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent
uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a
likelihood of confusion." H. R. Rep. No. 104-374, p. 1029 (1995). See also Moseley v. V.
Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S.Ct. I115, 1123 (2002).
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the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark,
and to obtain such other relief as is provided in
00
this subsection.'
To establish a prima facie case for trademark dilution under
Section 43(c), the plaintiffs mark must be 1) famous; 2) the
defendant must make commercial use of the mark in commerce; 3)
which use began after the mark became famous; 4) and which use
dilutes the quality of the mark to identify and distinguish goods and
0
services.1 1

The Gator plaintiffs argued that Gator's commercial use of its
marks blurred consumers' ability to identify the plaintiffs as the
source of the goods and service. 10 2 Furthermore, the plaintiffs
claimed that the "nature of certain of Gator Corp.'s advertisers and
pop-up advertisements displayed by the Gator Corp." tarnished their
goodwill in several ways. 1° 3 First, the plaintiffs argued that the popup ads undermined their ability to control the content that appears on
their own Web site. 10 4 This allowed Gator to alter the "look and feel"
of the plaintiffs' Web site product. Second, plaintiffs argued that they
had lost control over the frequency of pop-up ads. 10 5 This, they
argued, disparaged their goodwill because pop-up ads are annoying to
consumers. Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the content of the popup advertisements could potentially clash with their Web pages in
ways that were offensive to consumers.' 0 6 For example, Gator could
potentially launch an advertisement for flight training school while
the plaintiffs' Web sites were running a story on the September 11 th
07
tragedy.
Pop-up advertising campaigns are the type of activity that Frank
Schecter-and the original champions of dilution theory-sought to
proscribe. 10 8 In addition to eroding goodwill by annoying consumers
100.

15 U.S.C. § I 125(c)(1) (2002).

101.
Golden West Financial v. WMA Mortgage Serv., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4100 *21-2
(N.D. Cal. 2003), citing Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998).
102.

Complaint at 32, Gator (CV 02-909-A).

103.

Id.

104.

Id.

105.

Id.

106.

Id.

107. Complaint at 32, Gator (CV 02-909-A). As a side note, while the author was viewing
the Wall Street Journal's web page in preparation for this piece, a pop-up advertisement for
surveillance cameras appeared, displaying an erotically dressed woman posing for a hidden
security camera. On a different occasion, a pop-up advertising online dating services covered
Toyota's Web site.
108.

See generally Schecter, supranote 93.
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and by displaying unwholesome and inferior products next to famous
marks, businesses using Adware usurp the power of the mark holder
to control the way a mark is used and displayed. Slowly, the
plaintiffs' mark "would lose in selling power if [any advertiser] used
it" in connection with his or her goods.'0 9 Therefore, plaintiffs whose
Web sites are covered by material they cannot control-especially
unwholesome and inferior products-should be afforded redress
under the FTDA. Although the Supreme Court of the United States
recently raised plaintiffs' burden of proof for showing dilution,1 10 if a
plaintiff's mark is famous and was used prior to the junior user's use
of the mark-such as those in Gator-the plaintiff should have little
difficulty in making its case.
VI. DEFENSES
A.

The FirstAmendment: Commercial Speech

Gator argued that an injunction would violate its First
Amendment rights."'
Trademarks are symbols. Symbols-like
advertisements-communicate messages and ideas. At first glance, it
would seem that Gator and its advertisers should be free to use any
mark or advertisement to freely communicate ideas or propose
commercial transactions. One scholar summarized this reasoning by
stating, "[i]f the freedom of speech were absolute, every trademark
law would be unconstitutional on its face[;] [a]fter all, any law barring
the use of certain words and symbols directly abridges freedom of
speech."" 12 Such words adequately capture the inherent tension that
exists between First Amendment protections and the rights of
trademark holders. As the scholar alluded, however, commercial
speech, ideological expression, and other exercises of the First
Amendment are far from absolute.
In 1980, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Commission of New York. The
overarching issues presented in Central Hudson were twofold: 1)
109. Id. at 831-32.
110. See Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2002) (holding that
plaintiffs must prove actual dilution, and not merely the likelihood of dilution). See also,
Golden West Financial v. WMA Mortgage Serv., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4100, at *24 (N.D.
Cal. 2003).
111. Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at14, Gator (CV 02-909A).
112. Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay Olympics Case, 69 B.U.L. REV.
131, 134 (1989).
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Does commercial speech ("speech that proposes a commercial
transaction") deserve First Amendment protection, and if so, 2) what
13
level of judicial scrutiny should be applied to commercial speech?,
The Court's answer to the first question answers whether pop-up ads
deserve First Amendment protection.
The Court ultimately held that commercial speech deserved
limited protection under the First Amendment. As a threshold
requirement, however, the speech cannot be misleading or promote an
unlawful activity."14 Accordingly, one commentator has noted, "[i]f a
mark is used in the typical manner and... likelihood of confusion is
found, the mark is deemed misleading and the free-speech inquiry is
over."" 5 Under this logic, trademark law and the First Amendment
are reconciled and remain mutually exclusive theories. If a pop-up
advertisement is likely to confuse consumers as to association,
authorization, or sponsorship, the First Amendment protects neither
the ad server host nor the advertiser.
B. Fair Use
Both the FTDA and Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act provide
defendants with a "fair use" defense.' 6 Based on common and case
law, courts have broken down the fair use defense into two categories:
classic fair use, and nominal fair use (comparative advertising). The
Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine

113.
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
114. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 ("For commercial speech to come within [the First
Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.").
115. GILSON, supra note 43, § 11.08[3][t][ii].
116.
[T]he use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use,
otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or
of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device
which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the
goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin...
15 U.S.C. § II 15(b)(4) (2002).

[T]he following shall not be actionable under this section: (A)Fair use of a
famous mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or
promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous
mark; (B)Noncommercial use of a mark; (C) All forms of news reporting and
news commentary.
FTDA § 1125(c)(4).
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illustrates the distinction between the two categories.
Al Jardine, the defendant, was a member of a renowned band,
The Beach Boys. Mike Love, Al Jardine, Brian Wilson, Carl Wilson,
and Dennis Wilson formed The Beach Boys in 1961, and formed
Brother Records, Inc. ("BRI"), the plaintiff, in 1967.18 The Beach
Boys formed BRI to manage the band's intellectual property rights.
Since that time, however, the band has-to the dismay of many
surfers and fans-split apart. Despite the falling out, BRI continues
to administer the band's trademark, "The Beach Boys."1' 19
In 1998, Al Jardine's attorney advised BRI that Jardine would
120
begin touring under the name "Beach Boys Family and Friends."
BRI insisted that if Jardine performed music under a name using
"Beach Boys," his use would be infringing, absent a license. 121 The
parties tried to negotiate a license, but reached an impasse on the
royalty terms. 12 Nevertheless, Jardine went ahead and performed
under various titles that incorporated BRI's mark. On April 9, 1999,
BRI filed a complaint for trademark infringement.' 23
1. Classic Fair Use
Jardine claimed that his use of "Beach Boys" constituted classic
fair use. 12 4 Citing Professor McCarthy in one of its prior decisions,
the court stated that the classic fair use defense "applies only to marks
that possess both a primary meaning and a secondary meaning-and
only when the mark is used in its primary descriptive sense rather
than its secondary trademark sense."' 125 This defense applies to both
descriptive and suggestive marks that carry both a primary and
secondary meaning.1 26 In other words, the classic fair use defense
bars trademark holders from removing common descriptive words
from the public domain.
The court used "MovieBuff' from Brookfield as an example,

117.
118.
119.
120.

Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at901.
Id. at 901-02.
Id. at 902.

121.

Id.

122.

Id.

123.

Jardine, 318 F.3d. at 902.

124.

Id. at 903.

125.
Id. at 905, citing Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION, §

11:45 (4th ed. 2001)).
126. Id. at 906-907.
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where the defendant could use "Movie Buff' (with a space) as a
metatag, but could not use "MovieBuff;" the former was primarily
suggestive of a motion picture enthusiast, whereas, the later carried
secondary meaning as a trademark designating Brookfield's
entertainment database. 27 In the Ninth Circuit's opinion, Jardine did
not use The Beach Boys in its descriptive sense (to describe "boys
who frequent a stretch of sand beside the sea"). 128 Instead, he used
BRI's mark as a trademark, thus the classic fair use defense was
unavailable to him. So should the case be with ad host servers like
Gator and pop-up advertisers.
Gator allegedly used marks such as "Knight Ridder Digital,"
"Epicurious," and "the Boston Globe."' 129 On the spectrum of
trademark strength, these marks are designated as arbitrary and
fanciful and do not even have a primary meaning in the English
language. As to these marks then, the classic fair use defense is not
available. If Gator had used other marks that were classified on the
spectrum as descriptive or suggestive, the issue of classic fair use
would be more difficult. The result would largely depend on the
theory of "use" to which a court subscribed.
As discussed in Part III supra, ad server hosts "use" marks in
commerce by either keying them to pop-up advertisements or based
on the single advertisement approach. If a descriptive mark-such as
SWEET-were keyed to a pop-up advertisement, a court would most
likely find that the defendant's use was fair use. 130 If, on the other
hand, a court subscribes to the single advertisement approach, the
defendant's use of the mark should not be fair use. In most cases, the
plaintiff displays its mark as a trademark, not a product descriptor.
The defendant cannot manipulate the content of plaintiffs underlying
Web site to display the plaintiff's mark in a descriptive way;
therefore, when the defendant's pop-up advertisement window
appears together with the plaintiffs mark, the defendant is using the
plaintiffs mark in its secondary sense and classic fair use is
unavailable.
2.

Nominal Fair Use (Comparative Advertising)

Arguing in the alternative, Jardine claimed that his use of "The
127.
128.
129.
130.
F.3d 267,

Id.at 907.
Id.
Complaint at 31-32, Gator (CV 02-909-A).
See Jardine, 318 F.3d at 906 (citing Car Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 70
269 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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Beach Boys" was nominal fair use. 13' Nominal fair use is the
opposite of classic fair use: "[w]here the defendant uses the trademark
not in its primary, descriptive sense, but rather in its secondary,
32
trademark sense, the nominative fair use analysis applies."'
Nominal fair use is often referred to as use for "comparative
advertising" out of the judiciary's recognition that "it is often virtually
impossible to refer to a particular product for purposes of comparison,
criticism, point of reference, or any other such purpose without using
the mark."1 33 And as a matter of policy, comparative advertising is a
sanctioned use of registered marks because'' 34"product comparison and
imitation are the lifeblood of competition."
To establish the nominative fair use defense, the defendant has
the burden135 of proving:
[F]irst, the product or service in question [is] not readily
identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of
the mark or marks [is] used as is reasonably necessary to identify
the product or service; and third, the user [has done] nothing that
would, in conjunction with the mark,
suggest sponsorship or
36
endorsement by the trademark holder. 1
The court in Jardine found that it was impossible to refer to the
Beach Boys without using their mark. 137 The second requirement was
moot. 38 On the third requirement, however, the court found that
Jardine's promotional materials suggested sponsorship by the Beach
131.

Jardine,318 F.3d at 903.

132.
Jardine,318 F.3d at 908 (citing New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971
F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992)).
133.

Id.

134. Thomas Schatzel, Lecture on Unfair Competition, Santa Clara University School of
Law,Mar.26, 2002 (on file with the author).
135.
The third requirement of the nominative fair use defense-the lack of anything that
suggests sponsorship or endorsement-is merely the other side of the likelihood-of-confusion
coin." See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:47 (4th ed.

2001) (noting "some confusion in the case law as to whether 'fair use' is really a distinct and
separate 'defense' " and arguing that " 'fair use' should be viewed as merely one type of use
which is not likely to cause confusion"). Id.
We have held that the nominative fair use analysis replaces the likelihood-ofconfusion analysis set forth in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-

49 (9th Cir. 1979). Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150. Therefore, whereas plaintiff carries
the burden of persuasion in a trademark infringement claim to show likelihood of
confusion, see Thane Int'l, 305 F.3d at 900, the nominative fair use defense shifts
to the defendant the burden of proving no likelihood of confusion.
Jardine, 318 F.3d at n.5.
136.

Jardine,318 F.3d at 908.

137.

Id.

138.

Id.
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Boys band, and that Jardine used the mark for "enhanced marquee
value.' ' 139 Thus, both Jardine's classical and nominative fair use
arguments failed.
Pop-up ad litigation would probably resemble Jardine's case on
the issues of nominative fair use. First, the plaintiffs' products and
services in Gator, like BRI's product, most likely cannot be identified
without making reference to the mark. A competitor of the plaintiffs
could not specifically identify The New York Times, The Wall Street
Journal, or The Washington Post simply by referring to "major daily
newspapers."
Second, under the single advertisement view, the pop-up ad
server has little control over how much of a plaintiffs mark they use.
The ad server host, like Gator, uses as much of the plaintiffs mark as
the plaintiff incorporates into its underlying Web site. If the markholder's Web site displays multiple images of the protected mark, and
all the marks are still visible despite the pop-up ad, the pop-up ad
server has used an unreasonable amount of the plaintiffs mark to
identify the plaintiffs product or service. In contrast, if the plaintiff's
mark is displayed merely once, then the ad server most likely has
used no more than a reasonable amount of the plaintiff's mark.
The third requirement that the ad host server must prove is that
use of the marks on the underlying Web site does not suggest
sponsorship, authorization or endorsement by the mark-holder. The
outcome of this requirement is difficult to predict because it is based
on the facts of each case. In Gator, Gator offered no survey of its
own to rebut the consumer survey proffered by the plaintiffs in
support of their motion for preliminary injunction. Instead, Gator
attacked the credibility and design of the plaintiffs' survey. 140 If the
dispute in Gator had proceed to trial, and if Gator mounted a fair use
defense, Gator would have had the burden of proving no likelihood of
confusion. 14 1 And in light of the survey proffered by the plaintiffsshowing that 66% of those surveyed believed that pop-up
advertisements are sponsored by or authorized by the Web site in
which they 42appear-the odds that Gator would have met this burden
seem slim.1
139.

Id.

140.

Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 19-20, Gator (CV02-

909-A).
141.

See Jardine, supra note 117.

142.
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Preliminary Injunction
at 13, Gator (CV 02-909-A). Of course, this assumes that the plaintiffs' survey design and
analysis is valid to the judge and credible to the trier of fact.
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VII.POLICY CONCERNS
A. Informed Consumers
Concluding that pop-up windows infringe unfair competition
laws operates as a prohibition on an entire category of advertising.
This raises the question of whether the benefits of advertising
outweigh the justifications underlying unfair competition laws. The
main benefit of pop-up advertising is that it keeps consumers
informed.
Truthful advertising informs consumers of their choices. This
leads to greater efficiency and competition among competing firms.
Justice Blackmun, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, best described the value of advertising in
our economic culture as follows:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what
price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter
of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is .indispensable. And if it is indispensable
to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it
is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to
how that system ought to be regulated or altered. 143
Adware does exactly what advertisements are supposed to do: it
facilitates the free flow of alternative choices.
A few pop-up
advertisements even quote the advertiser's prices, giving consumers a
side-by-side price comparison. Sometimes Adware also reduces the
consumer's research costs. By typing in keywords relating to a
particular good or service, the Adware provides more information at
one time than the consumer would have gotten without Adware.
Thus, at first glance, Adware seems to support the value of
advertising in a free enterprise economy as expressed by Justice
Blackmun.
The argument in favor of advertising, however, assumes that
consumers actually take into account all the information available to
them on the subject of their research. This assumption is misplaced
143.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
765 (1976).
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while analyzing a research format like the Internet though, where too
much information at one time could actually have an opposite effect
on consumer awareness. Unbridled, pop-up ad technology could lead
to such a deluge of information at one time that consumers may begin
to wholly disregard whatever information the pop-up window has to
offer. Imagine if multiple ad server hosts all sold the exact same
keyword, or similar keywords, to several different advertisers. Once
a consumer enters that keyword into an address or search field, the
user's ability to passively research on the Internet could basically be
usurped by pop-up on top of pop-up on top of pop-up.... Instead of
pursuing each pop-up ad (which incidentally could compound the
problem), users most likely will become annoyed and overwhelmed,
and try to close the windows. Consumers using the Internet already
have a decent research tool: search engine technology. Even so, most
would agree that search engines complicate awareness and research
enough as it is. 144 Pop-up advertisements provide nominal help, at
best, and arguably create diminishing returns.
Additionally, if the rationale in support of advertising is that
consumers are more informed about the goods and services they are
in the market for, the majority of pop-up ads do not fit within that
rationale. Most pop-up ads contain anything but the information for
which the consumer is searching; 145 they do not even correlate with
the consumer's online research needs. Make no mistake, hijacking
campaigns do represent a minority of pop-up ads specifically tailored
to that which the user is searching. But almost anyone who has
recently done research or shopping on the Internet knows that the
majority of pop-up windows offer absolutely no help, and bare no
relationship to their specific consumer needs. Again, the pop-up
advertisements are often more annoying than helpful and are usually
disregarded as useless information.
B. Commercial Morality
One of the reasons unfair competition laws exist is to preserve a
Unfair competition laws "reflect
moral business environment.
society's concept that certain forms of competitive behavior are
reprehensible and unfair." 146 Such laws evolved from business

144.

See O'Rourke, supra note 61, at 294-95.

See supra note 107.
146.
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION §
2:04 (3d ed. 1995).
145.
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practices designed to draw away customers from a competitor.'
Adware schemes are consciously designed to steal a competitor's
potential customers. Adware companies even tout the fact that they
For
can target potential consumers anywhere on the Internet.
instance, the front page of FlashTrack's Web site states,

FlashTrack delivers targeted messages anywhere on the Internet.
We reach the Web surfer in real time, based on where they are and
what they may be doing online. By reaching users wherever they
are, whatever they may be doing and whenever a marketer desires,
FlashTrack delivers messages that have more impact!
FlashTrack's users actively choose to download our software to
of Surfing technology and to
benefit from our real time Point 148
support our many software partners.
Put differently, Adware programmers are in the business of
placing advertisements right where they will draw customers away
from their client's competitors. Likewise, ad server hosts and pop-up
advertisers fully intend to use Adware for the same purpose. Adware
epitomizes the idea of an unethical business practice-especially in
the context of hijack campaigns. Thus, the judiciary can find solace
in the fact that proscribing pop-up window advertisements would
sustain commercial morality as a policy underlying unfair competition
laws.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although there are market solutions being developed to help
consumers avoid pop-up advertisements, 149 the judiciary's position on
such ads is pending. For certain, pop-up advertisement litigation is on
the rise,' 50 presenting courts with yet another technology which has
147.
1962)).
148.

Id. (citing People ex rel. Mosk v. Nat'l Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765 (3d Dist.
Flashtrack, Flashtrack'sProximity Marketing, at

http://www.flashtrack.net/index.html (last viewed April 7, 2003) (emphasis in original).
149.

Rob Pegoraro, You Don't Have to Take Pop-Ups Lying Down, NEWSBYTEs (Mar. 23,

2003). E.g., Lavasoft produces Ad-Aware which searches for and removes embedded software
on the PC. Ad-Aware can be downloaded for free at http://www.lavasoft.de/support/download/.
Browsers such as Mozilla 7.01 and Netscape have options to ignore pop-up coding in Web
pages.

150. There are currently 10 actions involving Gator pending in different federal district
courts, including five actions for declaratory relief that Gator initiated: Gator.com v. L.L. Bean,
C-01-1126-MEJ (N.D. Cal. March 19, 2001) The Gator Corp. v. L.L. Bean, CV-01-1713-HU
(D. Or. Nov. 27, 2001); United Parcel Serv. of Am. v. Gator Corp., l:02-CV-2639-BBM (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 26, 2002); Gator Corp. v. Extended Stay Am. Inc., C-02-5226-CRB (N.D. Cal. Oct.
29, 2002); Six Continents Hotels v. Gator Corp., 1:02-CV-3065-JOF (N.D. Ga. Nov. 12, 2002);
Extended Stay Am. Inc. v. Gator Corp., 7:02-3845-20 (D.S.C. Nov. 14, 2002); Lendingtree Inc.
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no true non-Internet analogue. As such, courts are being asked to
resolve novel issues in various areas of the law,' 5' including unfair
competition.
In trademark and dilution cases, whether an ad server host-like
Gator-"uses" in commerce another's trademark by launching pop-up
windows is perhaps the dispositive question. Viewing the PC user's
screen as a single advertisement suggests that pop-up windows do
"use" the marks appearing underneath and alongside them. The
single advertisement theory is perhaps the most appropriate to
endorse in pop-up ad litigation, because it accurately reflects how
consumer's interface with advertising campaigns in cyberspace. To
be clear, no analytical distinction should exist between pop-up
windows and underlying Web sites because, as vast as it may seem,
consumers experience cyberspace on a two dimensional plane.
Similarly, the initial interest use approach-stemming from the
banner advertisement and metatag cases-also supports a finding that
Adware programs "use" trademarks; e-businesses use marks and
domain names by selling them as "keyed" terms to advertisers.
Initial interest confusion further suggests that a mark-holder's
case against ad host servers and pop-up advertisers is strong. When a
competitor's ad partially covers the underlying Web site, the nature of
the Internet leads the consumer to falsely believe that the competitor
and Web site owner are somehow affiliated or that the Web site has
authorized the pop-up advertisement. 52 This confusion may lead
consumers initially interested in the Web site to click on the pop-up
ad and go to a competitor's site. Initial interest confusion alone does
not lead to infringement liability. But the initial interest confusion
view is useful in that it explains how consumers become confused
about the sponsorship and affiliation of businesses by using the
Internet to research goods and services.
v. Gator Corp., 3:02-CV-519-V (W.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2002); Gator Corp v. Pricegrabber Inc., C02-5875-BZ (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2002); Gator Corp. v. Tigerdirect Inc., C-02-5875-BZ (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 19, 2002); Tigerdirect Inc. v. Gator Corp., C-02-23615 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2002).
BNA, Gator Granted Stay of Hertz's Suit Until MDL Panel Decides Motion to Consolidate,
PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT (Mar. 26, 2003), v.8, no. 12, at 317.
The plaintiffs in Gator also alleged that Adware infringed their public display and
151.
derivative work rights under the Copyright Act of 1976. Common law misappropriation was
also pled. Complaint at 33-34, Gator (CV 02-909-A).Trespass, quasi contract and other causes
of action within the pop-up advertisement context will eventually require judicial analysis,
although there is still confusion on how to apply these claims to the Internet. See BNA, 9th
Circuit Asks California High Court to Rule, PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT (Jan. 10,

2003), v.65, no.1604, at 218.
152. Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Preliminary Injunction
at 19, Gator (CV 02-909-A).
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Holders of famous marks should also find that the FTDA
provides protection against ad host servers and advertisers. Pop-up
advertisements fall within both the tarnishment and blurring theories
of dilution; the advertisements strip from Web site owners their right
to control the way their products are presented and the way their
marks are used. The pop-up windows could gradually disassociate
the Web site owner's goods from its trademarks. Furthermore, the
content of pop-up ads is often unwholesome and offensive, which
damages the goodwill and reputation of the underlying Web site.
Ad host servers and advertisers facing unfair competition claims
most likely will defend their actions based on fair use and the First
Amendment. The merits of their defenses, of course, will depend on
the facts of each case. As a general proposition, however, where
advertising is used in a misleading way, the First Amendment affords
no shelter to unfair competition claims. Similarly, classic fair use
should be unavailable to defendants in most cases because most
plaintiffs display their marks on their Web sites in the secondary,
trademark sense. The issue of comparative advertising, or nominal
fair use, will depend on whether the defendant is able to affirmatively
prove that use of the plaintiffs underlying Web content does not
create confusion as to sponsorship, association or authorization.
Finally,
the justifications underlying American unfair
competition laws suggest that Adware schemes should be banned
from the Internet.
Adware is specifically designed to "hijack"
customers amongst competitors. As a matter of commercial morality,
the judiciary should confidently prohibit this practice as it undermines
fundamental notions of fair competition and civility on the Internet.

